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Abstract 
There are several different ways in which chance affects evolutionary 
change. That all of these processes are called “random genetic drift” 
is in part a due to common elements across these different processes, 
but is also a product of historical borrowing of models and language 
across different levels of organization in the biological hierarchy. A 
history of the concept of drift will reveal the variety of contexts in 
which drift has played an explanatory role in biology, and will shed 
light on some of the philosophical controversy surrounding whether 
drift is a cause of evolutionary change. 
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The concept of “random drift,” not unlike the concept of “gene” or 
“fitness,” has become a “concept in tension” (to paraphrase Falk 2000) 
that has triggered a substantial debate among philosophers of biology. 
In the last ten years philosophers have debated whether random genetic 
drift1 is properly understood as a process or an outcome (Millstein, 
2002, 2005; Brandon, 2005), whether the force metaphor is appropriate 
to describing either selection or drift (Matthen and Ariew 2002; 
Shapiro and Sober forthcoming), and finally, whether and in what sense 
drift is a cause (Matthen and Ariew 2002; Walsh et al. 2002; Riesman 
and Forber 2005; Shapiro and Sober forthcoming). One reading of this 
exchange is that it is all a tempest in a teapot; drift is as well-
defined a concept as any in mathematical evolutionary biology. 
However, the extent of the philosophical debate suggests that there 
are larger issues at stake. Arguably, this debate reflects more deep-
seated and long-standing issues in evolutionary biology (and 
metaphysics). Going back to Mayr’s (1959) critique of “beanbag 
genetics,” there has been a concern among evolutionary biologists 
about the scope and limitations of classical population genetics, the 
relationship between the formal and the empirical in biology, and, 
more broadly, how to integrate understanding of pattern and process at 
different levels in the biological hierarchy–from molecular evolution 
to speciation. Drift has become the latest focus around which 
philosophers of biology debate these issues.  Further, the debate is 
connected to a larger debate in general philosophy of science about 
levels and modes of causation, or, what may count as a cause. 
One element missing from much of the recent philosophical 
discussion is a historical dimension. Drift, like “gene” and “fitness” 
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is a concept that has evolved over the past 75 years; understanding 
how and why may help resolve some of these debates or, at the very 
least, identify the sources of confusion. 
Discussion of the drift concept among philosophers has (in large 
part) proceeded on the basis of a few key examples and textbooks’ 
definitions of drift. Yet, when one consults textbooks in evolutionary 
genetics, a variety of not entirely consistent definitions of drift 
are available. Drift refers to “chance fluctuations of allele 
frequency” which occur “particularly in small populations, as a result 
of random sampling among gametes”(Hartl 1988: 16) Or, drift is “a 
dispersive force that removes genetic variation from populations,” 
which might be due to either “variation in the number of offspring 
between individuals, and, if the species is diploid and sexual, from 
Mendel’s law of segregation”(Gillespie 1998: 19). Finally, drift is 
“the process of change in gene frequency due solely to chance 
effects”(Grauer and Li 2000: 48). These three texts describe drift as 
both the “result” of random sampling, the force removing genetic 
variation, and a process of change due to chance.  In other words, 
drift is spoken of interchangeably as effect and cause, pattern and 
process.  Different accounts of the chief effect of drift are offered, 
from “fluctuations of allele frequency” to “the removal of genetic 
variation.” Drift is also attributed to different causes — 
“segregation” as well as “chance variation in the number of offspring 
between individuals.” In other words, drift is due to different kinds 
of mechanisms at work at different time scales and levels of 
organization, from meiotic segregation and recombination, to chance 
elements affecting fertilization, to random environmental factors such 
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as natural catastrophes that affect whether some individuals but not 
others survive and reproduce. 
As the above texts illustrate, drift has become a sort of 
“kludge” concept in biology— collectively referring to a variety of 
different ways in which chance broadly understood affects evolving 
populations over time. Likewise, over the history of the use of this 
concept, the term “drift” has been used to refer to a variety of 
outcomes and a variety of causes. As Beatty’s has argued, “Random 
drift is a heterogeneous category of causes and effects… the 
collective phenomena are very different. Moreover, there are phenomena 
sometimes included in the category of random drift that have nothing 
to do with random sampling”(Beatty 1992: 273) With such a diversity of 
referents and applications of the concept, perhaps it is not 
surprising that philosophers have so heatedly contested the nature of 
drift. 
In addition to the fact that drift has historically been used to 
identify a variety of causes and effects, there is a rather large gap 
between the classical “Wright-Fisher” model of drift and the variety 
of ways in which chance events effect populations over time. The 
binomial random sampling model (see box insert at end of text) treats 
drift as the random sampling of alleles (with replacement) from one 
generation to the next; where the outcome is a form of “sampling 
error.” As a result of this sampling process, some alleles are fixed 
and others are lost. In smaller populations, this process is 
accelerated; or, the time to fixation of an allele will be shorter. 
The mathematical model of drift thus permits predictions of outcomes 
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in systematic ways. Taking smaller sample sizes increases the time to 
fixation or loss of alleles by chance alone. 
This basic model was developed in the 1920s and 30s, when very 
little was known about the mechanisms of inheritance or causes of 
variability at the molecular level. The drawing of alleles as akin to 
the drawing of balls from an urn was treated as an appropriate analogy 
for the process of “sampling” of alleles in a population via genetic 
recombination, despite disanalogies between this process and the 
actual processes involved in random assortment and “sampling” at 
different levels of the biological hierarchy. Nonetheless, this model, 
and the label of “random genetic drift,” became a placeholder for 
what, at different levels of organization, are different “engines” and 
outcomes of chance. Though there are similarities in broad terms 
across these different contexts (extent of drift is contingent on 
population sizes), the specific biological factors at work in the 
“drifting” of nucleotides, cistrons, alleles, whole gene complexes, 
chromosomes, or for that matter, individuals and groups, are very 
different. These different contexts require subtle corrections to the 
original models. For instance, intracistronic recombination rates 
(rates of recombination between sites within the gene) are far smaller 
than those between genes, suggesting that the classical model requires 
subtle modification in this case (Ewens, 2004). 
There is no doubt that the classical binomial sampling model has 
been enormously successful as a tool for understanding the dynamics of 
evolution at the level of populations. Nonetheless, biology has 
changed so much since 1930, that historians and philosophers of 
biology have raised legitimate concerns as to whether the original 
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models of the dynamics of evolution are to some extent outmoded 
(Provine 2001), and, whether the ways of speaking of drift as a 
“dynamic force” are problematic (Matthen and Ariew 2002). In what 
follows, I will review the history of the tradition of modeling 
evolution that lead to philosophical controversies about drift as 
cause and effect, and use this historical analysis as a means of, if 
not resolving the philosophical debate to everyone’s satisfaction, at 
the least, clarifying issues at stake. 
 
 
Brief Historical Overview: Origins of Drift <A> 
 
Predecessors to the drift concept are found in Darwin’s discussion of 
variations “neither useful nor injurious” as polymorphic traits “not 
effected by natural selection” and therefore either left as 
“fluctuating elements” or “fixed” (Darwin 1859: 46, 81). Darwin did 
not discuss how or why these variations would become lost or fixed. 
Fleeming Jenkin, however, understood well the loss of variation due to 
isolation of small (particularly island) populations.  He treated the 
loss of variation via chance as a challenge to Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection in the review of the Origin.  That is, however fit a 
particular individual mutant, or individual, if isolated on a small 
island population, the advantageous variants will be “swamped” by less 
fit types (Jenkin illustrated this with a “burrowing hare” and 
another, (offensively racist) example.)  Moreover, Gulick’s discussion 
of the role of “indiscriminate destruction” of some members of a 
species in differentiation of Hawaiian land snails (Gulick 1889: 209) 
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was enormously influential for subsequent work on drift, as well as 
models of speciation. Gulick stressed natural catastrophes as sources 
of indiscriminate elimination of members of a group. In other words, 
his focus was on “sampling” at the level of whole subpopulations. 
However, the earliest formal treatments of random genetic drift 
focused largely on chance events in sexual reproduction (meiosis and 
“sampling of alleles”) (Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn 1921), which led to 
the models of Wright and Fisher. 
Fisher (1922) models the effects of drift in the context of 
discussion of what he calls the Hagedoorn (1921) thesis: namely, “that 
random survival is a more important factor in limiting the variability 
of species than preferential survival.” Fisher viewed the Hagedoorn’s 
argument as a threat to Darwinian evolution by natural selection, and 
argued that the Hagedoorn effect will not be substantial: “the decay 
in the variance of a species breeding at random without selection and 
without mutation, is almost inconceivably slow” (Fisher 1922: 323). 
Fisher acknowledges that randomness is crucial in the early 
stages of a mutation’s appearance in a population, or “While it is 
rare, its survival will be at the mercy of chance, even if it is well 
fitted to survive” (Fisher 1922: 326). Likewise, in small populations, 
the probability of survival of a single mutant will be small. However, 
Fisher showed how the eventual survival of a favorable new mutation is 
almost certain if a mutation is recurrent (Fisher 1922: 340). Or, 
Fisher demonstrates that the chance elimination of alleles is 
counterbalanced by recurrent mutation, given a high enough rate. This 
argument was central to Fisher’s demonstration that mutation and 
selection could, over time, yield substantial change in populations. 
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The 1922 paper may be viewed as Fisher’s attempt to vindicate 
selection against the threat of random loss of variation. In other 
words, Fisher views himself as defending Darwin against the very same 
criticisms that Jenkin raised in his review of the Origin.  The 
difference is that Fisher was far more familiar with statistics, and 
was able to draw an analogy with another discipline that treated 
statistical changes in large populations of entities – statistical 
mechanics.  Using this analogy, Fisher pictures the variation in a 
population as a normal distribution; mutation constantly supplies new 
variation, and chance eliminates new variants from a population. So, 
if the variation in some trait is pictured as a distribution about the 
mean, mutation will continually “expand” the bell-shaped curve, 
whereas chance will “shrink” the curve. In this way, and drawing upon 
the analogy he drew between evolution and statistical mechanics, 
Fisher was led to think of selection, mutation, migration, and drift 
as “forces.” Selection coefficients describe the relative advantage of 
some gene, or if a particular gene’s chance of survival is greater or 
less than one; selection may thus shift or skew the curve in one or 
another direction. The gene will thus either increase in frequency in 
a population over time, or decrease, or become eliminated by chance. 
Selection measures its “velocity” of increase, relative to other 
factors, such as population size, and rate of mutation. Fisher’s 
object in the 1922 and subsequent papers was to consider the relative 
role of each of these factors in the dynamics of evolution in 
populations.  
Fisher refers the dynamics of changes of gene frequency as akin 
to a physical-mechanical process, determined by forces, such as 
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mutation and selection, and chance elimination: “the effects of 
selection in modifying gene frequencies are… exhibited… by changes in 
position with velocities that are uniform and proportional only to the 
intensity of selection”(Fisher 1930: 79). In contrast, Wright (at 
least in the early stages of his theoretical work) preferred to speak 
of the “lability” and “plasticity” of a population – a population was 
rather like a clay that would be more or less “plastic,” given the 
extent of inbreeding, outbreeding, etc. A population was thus capable 
of being molded or “shaped” by breeders, or nature, as the case may 
be. Fisher’s way of modeling the dynamics of populations, while he 
used different metaphors of “velocity,” arguably influenced Wright’s 
thinking concerning the optimal “balance” of factors at work in any 
population.  
There was a very important difference between the two, however. 
Whereas Fisher viewed the effect of random loss of variation as a 
threat to selective explanations, and thus (in his view) to 
“Darwinism” itself, Wright came to view chance constructively or as a 
causal factor in evolution. This view of drift, as one factor 
increasing the “lability” of populations, eventually became one of 
several factors assisting in the eventual “movement” of populations up 
neighboring adaptive peaks, on Wright’s infamous adaptive landscape. 
However, Wright did not at first refer to drift per se as a distinct 
cause of evolution. In most of Wright’s early papers on the role of 
chance in evolution, “drift” was spoken of as an effect not a cause.  
In the 1920’s and early 30’s, Wright primarily spoke of drift as 
an “effect” of chance extinction, subdivision of populations, 
isolation, and inbreeding; genes would “drift” about equilibrium, and 
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“drifting” of frequencies of genes was due to other causes; but drift 
per se was not spoken of as a cause. Rather, Wright spoke of 
inbreeding or “isolation” as the “cause” of drift.  
What is inbreeding? Wright developed a formula for calculating 
the coefficient of inbreeding, or F. F represents the probability that 
two homologous alleles are identical by descent, or derived from a 
common ancestor. Inbreeding occurs when mates are more closely related 
than if chosen at random; in smaller populations, the chance that 
randomly chosen mates may be relatives is higher than in larger 
populations. Thus, in smaller populations, inbreeding is higher, and 
so too, in smaller populations, speed of fixation of genes due to 
nondeterministic factors is higher. Wright’s early reflections on 
inbreeding led him to consider that population size might play a 
significant role in evolution. 
In sum, Wright, at least in early discussions of the role of 
chance in evolution, spoke of drift as not a cause, but a consequence 
of inbreeding. For instance, one of Wright’s early disputes with 
Fisher over the evolution of dominance concerned whether “isolation 
effect” or, the effects of inbreeding in a population of small size, 
might compromise the role of selection in the evolution of dominance. 
At this stage in his debates with Fisher, Wright uses drift as a verb 
describing the behavior of alleles. Rather than view drift per se as a 
cause of evolution, Wright speaks of “isolation effect” (measured by 
1/2n) as one of three “factors which controls the fate of the gene.” 
Genetic factors “drift to fixation” as a consequence of isolation. 
Drift, then, is referred to as a consequence, not a cause of 
evolutionary change. Wright’s emphasis on isolation and his dispute 
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with Fisher was the first round in a lasting debate over the relative 
significance of drift and selection in evolution. But, at this stage, 
in the early 1930s, it was not “drift” versus “selection” that was at 
issue; rather, it was the various causes of chance elimination: 
isolation, inbreeding, or patterns of mating that were the “causes” of 
“fluctuating” allele frequencies. 
In his classic 1931 paper, when enumerating the factors 
contributing to genetic homogeneity, Wright does not list drift; 
instead, he speaks of drift as a consequence of restricting population 
size. Alleles may “drift” to fixation, but at this stage, the “cause” 
of the process Wright had in mind was inbreeding. In sum, at this 
stage, “drift,” referred the random elimination of genes in a 
population, due to inbreeding effects. The major cause of fixation not 
due to fitness differences at this time was, in Wright’s view, not 
“drift” per se, but isolation and inbreeding: “the factor of isolation 
is of utmost importance in evolution” (1929: 279). Isolation and 
inbreeding due to patterns of mating within small relatively isolated 
groups was described as the cause of loss of genetic heterogeneity. 
 
 
Drift Extrapolated <A> 
 
What led biologists to speak of drift as an independent causal factor 
in evolution, and not a consequence of isolation or “inbreeding 
effect”? There were three main factors.  First, the force of the 
metaphor of selection and drift as “forces” moving populations around 
the adaptive landscape became an effective way to popularize the 
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otherwise rather complex and abstruse science of classical population 
genetics.  Second, during the synthesis, “random genetic drift” became 
identified with the “Sewall Wright effect,” and appeal to this effect 
for explanations of non-adaptive differences within and between 
populations became enormously common (Provine 1986: 405). Further, 
with the polarizing of Wright and Fisher over the relative 
significance of isolation and chance versus selection, drift became 
the name for the competing “force” of chance in evolution. In sum, 
with the popularization of Wright’s “adaptive landscape” model for 
representing evolutionary change over time, and its invocation in 
explanations of a variety of otherwise puzzling phenomena, drift 
became identified as one of several causal mechanisms of evolution. 
Non-adaptive differences within and between populations and species – 
from blood groups to patterns on snail shells to patterns of 
speciation were all explained by drift (see Beatty 1987, 1992). 
For instance, Dobzhansky appealed to the “Sewall Wright effect” 
to explain polymorphisms in man such as blood groups: 
 
polymorphisms in man (e.g. blood group heterozygosis or homozygosis) 
may… as far as one is able to judge at present, be explained by random 
fluctuations in gene frequencies in effectively small populations. 
Such random variations of gene frequencies are referred to as the 
genetic drift, or Sewall Wright effect. (Dobzhansky 1957: 156) <BLOCK 
QUOTE> 
 
Dobzhansky elaborated, appealing to Wright’s classical “U” and bell 
shaped graphs to represent the relative significance of selection and 
population size in the retention or loss of alleles: 
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The smaller the effective population size, the greater are random 
variations in gene frequencies, and the less effective become weak 
selection pressures. In small populations, alleles favored by 
selection may be lost and the les favored ones may reach fixation. In 
very large populations, even very small selective advantages and 
disadvantages will eventually be effective; but a more rigorous 
selection must be applied to overcome the genetic drift in small 
populations. (1957: 161) <BLOCK QUOTE> 
 
Here Dobzhansky contrasts selection and drift, not explicitly as 
distinct “forces” so much as competing explanations for the retention 
or loss of an allele. In smaller populations, alleles are more likely 
to be either fixed or lost due to random factors; in significantly 
larger populations, the effects of even small selection coefficients 
will eventually lead to fixation of alleles. The fact that population 
size “constrains” the power of selection, lends itself to the idea 
that selection and drift are “competing forces” of evolution that may 
be decomposed. In other words, the relative significance of each is 
contingent upon the other. 
Dobzhansky goes on to note an important “biological highly 
significant corollary” of the above, namely, that “a species, broken 
up into isolated colonies, may differentiate as a result of the 
restriction of population sizes” (p. 162). After discussion of a few 
examples, e.g., Hawaiian land snails and non-adaptive differentiation 
in Drosophila, he writes: “restriction of the genetically effective 
size of natural populations is in all probability an important agent 
of differentiation of species into local groups possessing different 
genotypes” (p. 176). 
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In other words, Dobzhansky and other authors of the synthesis 
appropriated the “Sewall Wright effect” to explain everything from 
nonadaptive differences within species to speciation itself (Provine 
1986; Beatty 1987). Huxley also appealed to the “Sewall Wright effect” 
as an explanation of not only non-adaptive differences between 
populations, but also similar differences between species, and even 
whole taxonomic groups. In Huxley’s words, the “Sewall Wright effect” 
“at one stroke explains many facts which puzzled earlier 
selectionists,” for instance, the “greater degree of divergence shown 
by islands,” and other “recent taxonomic discoveries”(Huxley 1942: 
199-200, 260). 
Despite the fact that Wright originally referred to drift as a 
consequence, and not a cause of evolutionary change, “random genetic 
drift” came to replace the “Sewall Wright effect” as the sum of a 
multi-stage and multi-factor roles of isolation and inbreeding and 
their effects on the distribution of alleles. Moreover, with the 
popularization of his adaptive landscape model, the role of drift 
began to be used to explain the fate of populations and whole species. 
For instance, Ernst Mayr’s (1942) “founder effect”–speciation via 
the isolation of small subpopulations, followed by “drift” to new 
adaptive peaks–is arguably an extension of the “Sewall Wright” effect 
up the hierarchy to species differences. Though Mayr denies any debt 
to Wright on this count, the process uses the same mechanism of change 
as Wright championed in his classic (1931) paper (Mayr 1963). This 
constituted a shift of speaking of drift within populations to drift 
as a cause of change up the hierarchy to species. 
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Wright (1949, 1955) confused the issue further by referring to 
randomly fluctuating selection coefficients as due to drift (discussed 
in Beatty 1992). Wright here expanded the concept of drift even 
further; explaining any apparently “random” behavior, even if driven 
by selection. 
With the “hardening” of the synthesis in the 1940s (Gould 1983), 
however, key examples of drift, such as blood groups, were found to 
have selective explanations. Nonetheless, the multistage and 
distributed processes of sampling in populations was christened as a 
single “force,” “drift” and the dialectic of the relative significance 
of drift versus selection was very much in play and continues into the 
21st Century. This was solidified by the polarization of Wright’s and 
Fisher’s views, in fallouts over the relative roles of chance and 
selection in explanation of some classic examples of apparent non-
adaptive differences between species.1 
 
Stepping Back <A> 
 
The concept of random genetic drift has been appealed to in a variety 
of biological contexts to explain a number of observations over the 
                                                
1 Not only did drift get appropriated “up” the hierarchy as 
playing a significant role in speciation and extinction, but also, it 
was applied “down” to the molecular level. In 1968, Motoo Kimura and 
King and Jukes independently proposed the neutral theory of molecular 
evolution. This is the view that the majority of evolutionary changes 
at the molecular level are caused by random drift of selectively 
neutral or nearly neutral alleles. According to Kimura, changes in 
amino acids are fixed by “drift.” The time to fixation of neutral 
alleles is determined by population size. In this sense, “drift” at 
the molecular level is analogous to founder and inbreeding effects; 
the relative impact of drift in both is dependent upon population 
size, even if the “mechanism” of sampling is likely quite different. 
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past 75 years. Drift is invoked to explain “fluctuating” 
polymorphisms, or apparently selectively neutral variation both within 
and between populations or species, loss of variation in populations, 
“randomly fluctuating” selection coefficients, and, finally apparently 
neutral variation at the molecular level. What all these appeals have 
in common is the notion that random changes in frequencies of genes 
(or, base pairs, whole gametes, and even populations) are attributable 
to something like “sampling”–where sampling is just indiscriminate 
fixation or elimination of genes, gametes, etc., independent of their 
selective advantage or disadvantage. 
In the initial models of drift, drift per se was not referred to 
as a cause, rather it was a consequence of “inbreeding effect.” Drift, 
like Darwin’s “fluctuation” was used as a metaphor to refer to the 
behavior of alleles under various forms of “random sampling.” During 
and after the early synthesis, the “Sewall Wright effect” was 
repeatedly invoked to explain patterns of apparently non-adaptive 
differences between species. Eventually, the term “random genetic 
drift” was deployed to generically describe the role of chance in 
populations over time at every level of organization. 
What does this historical survey reveal about drift? There are 
four key conclusions one may draw: 
(1) The classical Wright-Fisher model of drift as a binomial 
sampling process is an artifact of an age in which the mechanics of 
inheritance were poorly understood, and thus models the variety of 
ways in which chance affects evolutionary change in an idealized, 
indirect fashion. The shared feature of all cases of drift is that 
population size is relevant to predicting the effects of chance over 
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time. The varieties of modes of “sampling” at different levels of 
organization are more or less “black boxed” by this model. (2) 
(2) That drift is referred to as both effect and cause is not 
new.  Drift was originally a metaphor for the behavior of alleles in 
isolated, inbred populations.  Only relatively recently has drift 
taken its place as one of several dynamic “causes” of evolutionary 
change.   
(3) That Fisher modeled population genetic theory on statistical 
mechanics, and further, that Wright adopted the adaptive landscape 
metaphor for evolutionary change, helped solidify the view that drift, 
like selection, mutation, and migration, was a “force” of evolutionary 
change.  
(4) Testing claims about the relative significance of drift have 
been difficult from the beginning; as illustrated by the debates over 
blood groups, as well as the contentious issues that so divided Fisher 
and Wright. 
This historical overview may assist in assessing a heated 
philosophical exchange of late over whether and in what sense drift is 
a cause of evolutionary change. In part, the debate has hinged upon 
whether it is more appropriate to describe drift as effect or a cause 
of evolutionary change over time. As we have seen, this question has a 
historical precedent. For the concept of drift has itself evolved from 
a metaphor for describing the behavior of alleles due to chance in 
populations to a distinct “cause” or “force” of evolutionary change.   
However, the philosophical debate has extended beyond the matter 
of whether it is more appropriate to speak of drift as outcome or 
process.  Indeed, there are a family of overlapping issues at stake 
18 
 
here that have, unfortunately, become conflated. First, there is what 
I will call the metaphysical question: is drift (and, for that matter, 
natural selection) an epiphenomenal, or a genuinely supervienient, 
“population level” causal process?  More generally, are there any 
population level “processes” operating in evolution?  Second, there is 
what I will call the epistemological question.  Namely, how are claims 
about drift (or selection) empirically substantiated?  If many 
assessments of the relative significance of drift v. selection are 
empirically underdetermined; i.e., we see variation about a mean, or 
departure from expectation, and merely label it “drift,” then what 
supports claims to the effect that there is a distinct “process” is at 
work here that yields this outcome?  Why isn’t “drift” simply a 
“trashbin” that we put unknowns in – a signal that we lack information 
about causal process, rather than a claim about an indiscriminate 
sampling process that we know to be operating? It seems that these two 
distinct issues have been conflated in the debate about drift as a 
cause of evolutionary change. 
The exchange can be traced back to Sober’s (1984) influential 
text on the nature of selection. Sober describes evolutionary theory 
as a “theory of forces”: “In evolutionary theory, the forces of 
mutation, migration, selection and drift constitute causes that propel 
a population through a sequence of gene frequencies. To identify the 
causes of the current state… requires describing which evolutionary 
forces impinged” (1984: 141). Shapiro and Sober later call this the 
“conventional view” of evolution: 
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The conventional view, which WALM [Walsh, Ariew, Lewens and Matthen] 
oppose, is that natural selection, along with drift, mutation, 
migration, and mating pattern, are possible causes of evolution. These 
causes impinge on a population, sometimes changing its state while at 
other times causing the population to remain in the same state.3 The 
causes of evolution behave in some ways like Newtonian forces. If two 
forces promote the evolution of a trait, it will increase in frequency 
at a faster rate than if just one of them were in place. And a 
population can be at equilibrium because opposing forces cancel each 
other… for example, selection is pushing it to increase in frequency 
while mutation pressure is pushing it to decline. WALM call this the 
dynamic view. (Shapiro and Sober forthcoming) <BLOCK QUOTE> 
 
Shapiro and Sober argue that the view that genetic drift is a 
force or cause (just as are selection, migration, mutation) makes 
sense insofar as the reduction of population size (which they identify 
with drift) is one factor associated with changes frequencies of 
alleles in a population over time (p. 38). In other words, drift 
“removes” genetic variability in populations.  Drift and mutation (or, 
for that matter, selection and migration) are thus spoken of as 
“forces” with opposing tendencies; drift removes variation, mutation 
restores it.  These metaphors are surely problematic in some ways; 
yet, they do capture an important feature of evolutionary change at 
the level of populations.  Isolation and inbreeding reduce genetic 
variation; and, small subpopulations are likely to contain less 
variation than large interbreeding populations – e.g., the species as 
a whole.  In this sense, drift, or “chance” sampling, where this is 
understood to be any chance process involved in reducing the numbers 
of interbreeding individuals in some study population, is a “force” of 
change in the sense of (on average) reducing genetic variation. 
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This is referred to (appropriately) as a “consensus” view, 
insofar as many biologists today describe drift as if it were a 
“force” in reducing genetic variation over time due to something like 
the process of sampling error. (As we have seen, however, this was by 
no means the uniform sense of drift appealed to historically.) Like 
selection or mutation, drift can be spoken of metaphorically as 
opposed by competing “forces” – a population will be in equilibrium 
when these forces “cancel” one another. So, very small selective 
differences will not be terribly effective in smaller populations, due 
to the “effects” of drift (see also, Stephens, 2004). 
In reply to Sober, Shapiro, and Stephens, Walsh (2002), Matthen 
and Ariew (2002) and Walsh et al. (2002) have argued that evolutionary 
theory is not a theory of forces. The disputants identify this view as 
a “dynamical” view of evolutionary theory, and contrast it with their 
preferred “statistical” view. At the center of the dispute is whether 
individual deaths, births, and interactions of organisms with their 
environments can or should be supplemented with population level 
explanations, or whether the latter are simply statistical 
descriptions with no genuinely causal import. 
Matthen and Ariew (2002) claim that there are two concepts of 
fitness at work in evolutionary biology; one, “vernacular” or 
“ecological” fitness—fitness as relative adaptation or better “design 
solution,” versus fitness as a “predictive measure,” which is a 
statistical measure of the “expected relative rate of increase of some 
gene (or, trait), in future generations.” The former is not part of 
evolutionary theory at all, since there are no actual laws describing 
how fitness differences in this sense are caused. The latter is simply 
21 
 
a statistical measure, and thus, in their view, not a causal parameter 
at all. 
Walsh (2002) similarly argues that natural selection is a mere 
“shadow” of genuine causal processes; “there is no need to invoke a 
distinct force [of natural selection] operating over populations,” 
when, at the level of individual organisms, there already are the many 
causes of individual births and deaths (p. 139; italics in original; 
see also p. 150). Likewise, Walsh et al. (2002) defend the 
“statistical” over the “dynamical” interpretations of evolutionary 
theory: “Selection and drift are not forces acting on populations; 
they are statistical properties of an assemblage of “trial” events: 
births, deaths, and reproduction. The only genuine forces going on in 
evolution are at the level of individuals… and none of these can be 
identified with either selection or drift ” (p. 453). Walsh, Lewens, 
and Ariew (2002) say that drift occurs when and only when a population 
exhibits a trait frequency that deviates from the frequency that would 
be predicted if selection alone acted. I.e., the “drifting” or 
“fluctuations” in gene frequency are simply departures from 
expectation, where what was expected was based on what WALM call 
“predictive” fitness. Similarly, but more recently, Pigliucci and 
Kaplan (2006) write:  
 
Drift is not a process at all; the best sense that can be made of the 
concept appeals not to some property that particular populations 
share, but rather to the relative frequency of the kinds of changes 
that the populations have experienced. In a case in which changes 
observed are close to the changes statistically expected… we might say 
that the outcome reflects our expectations from predictive selection; 
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in a case in which the changes are more distant from the mean, we 
might say that the outcome does not reflect those expectations–that 
is, we might choose to call it an example of drift. But that does not 
imply that any kind of process took place in the latter population 
that did not take place in the former. (Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006: 28) 
<BLOCK QUOTE> 
 
There seem to be two separate issues at play in the above 
passage.  First, Pigliucci and Kaplan claim that drift is not a 
process.  This first claim more or less echoes the earlier discussion 
of WALM, to the effect that “formal” selection and drift are not 
distinct causal processes.  Second, they claim that what we call drift 
is often only a departure from expectation.  This latter claim seems 
to be more of an empirical critique of the practice of biology than a 
metaphysical claim about the nature of drift.  Arguably, these two 
issues may be pulled apart; whether or not there are population level 
causal processes in evolution, and whether biologists provide 
sufficient evidence in their assessments that drift or selection is 
operating are two separate questions, which may well have different 
answers.  In other words, one diagnosis of the debate is that there 
has been a conflation of these two issues.   
First, however, there are several respects in which critics of 
the “consensus” view are exactly correct. Formal models of selection 
and drift are statistical measures of change within populations over 
time. They treat average survival or reproductive success of trait 
groups as causal, and, to the extent that results depart from 
expectations, the outcome is often explained by “drift.” Drift is 
often identified with the variety of unknown chance factors affecting 
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survival and reproductive success. Indeed, Sober might well agree with 
this as a description of much of biological practice. 
However, it does not follow, at least without further argument, 
that drift and selection are not causes, or merely epiphenomenal. Both 
are genuine, if “supervenient” causal processes, according to Sober 
and Shapiro. Their argument for this claim depends upon a key 
assumption: “investigating whether X causes Y involves figuring out 
whether wiggling X while holding fixed whatever common causes there 
may be of X and Y will be associated with a change in Y. It is not 
relevant to ask what will happen if one wiggles X while holding fixed 
the micro-supervenience base of X.” This assumption draws upon 
Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist model of causation; according to 
Woodward: 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct 
cause of Y with respect to variable set V is that there be a 
possible intervention on X that will change Y or the probability 
distribution of Y when one holds fixed at some value all other 
variables in V. 
 
For Woodward, there are very precise conditions that must be met 
in order for it to be the case that I is an intervention on X with 
respect to Y.  An intervention on X must change the value of Y; it 
must be a sort of “switch” on Y, holding all other variables constant.  
Moreover, X must be a well-defined variable, such that it is clear 
what changing the value of this variable consists in.  In sum, causal 
claims are essentially claims about how manipulation of one variable, 
or change in the value of that variable, is capable of changing the 
value of a second variable.   
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Shapiro and Sober argue that selection and drift are supervenient 
causes that meet these conditions.  The “supervenience base” of 
selection, according to Shapiro and Sober, is the individual births 
and deaths of organisms in a population. Likewise, the “supervenience 
base” of drift is effective population size. One cannot “hold fixed” 
effective population size, and change the effects of drift. Claims to 
the effect that natural selection is not a cause because not distinct 
from the individual causal interactions that make up its supervenience 
base are thus not unlike claims to the effect that beliefs, desires, 
etc., are not causes, because not distinct from neurological states of 
the brain. Shapiro and Sober summarize: 
 
We reply that while it is true that natural selection is not distinct 
from its supervenience base in a given token selection process, this 
is not a reason to deny that selection is a cause. In the same way, we 
regard the temperature, pressure, and volume of the gas in a container 
as causes even though they supervene on the states of the molecules 
making up the gas. Walsh demands that selection contribute something 
to evolution beyond the contributions made by the causal processes the 
impinge on individual organisms... Of course selection cannot do this, 
but that is no argument against its causal efficacy. To assess whether 
X causes Y, you shouldn’t try to hold fixed the micro-supervenience 
base of X while wiggling X. <BLOCK QUOTE> 
 
In reply to WALM concerning drift, Shapiro and Sober argue that they 
confuse outcome with process: 
 
Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002) say that drift occurs when and only 
when a population exhibits a trait frequency that deviates from the 
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frequency that would be predicted if selection alone acted... For 
WALM, drift is a possible outcome; it is a product, not a process.4 
Drift is part of the evolutionary process whenever population 
size is finite, just as selection is part of that process whenever 
there is variation in trait fitness. We see no harm in viewing these 
two “parts” of the evolutionary process as processes unto 
themselves... Selection and drift are distinct processes whose 
magnitudes are represented by distinct population parameters 
(fitnesses on the one hand, effective population size on the other). 
Changes in each of these parameters will be associated with changes in 
the probabilities of different outcomes. If you intervene on fitness 
values while holding fixed population size, this will be associated 
with a change in the probability of different trait frequencies in the 
next generation. And the same is true if you intervene on population 
size and hold fixed the fitnesses. Selection and drift are causes 
because they are difference-makers. Fitness values and population size 
are emphatically not like the barometer in its relationship to the 
weather. <BLOCK QUOTE> 
 
 In sum, on average, reducing population sizes increases the time 
to fixation of rare alleles. This is all it means to assert that drift 
is a cause, in Shapiro and Sober’s view.  Random factors play a role 
in fixing alleles in smaller populations more quickly than such 
factors will in larger populations, in the same way in which doing a 
shorter run of coin flips will be more likely to result in exclusively 
heads or tails.  This is true for any ensemble of populations; smaller 
populations will show more deviations from expectation, due to 
“sampling error,” where deviations from expectation may be due to 
anything from lightning striking to genetic recombination. 
Forber and Reisman (2005) draw upon Dobzhansky’s and Pavlovsky’s 
drift “experiment” to illustrate this argument. Dobzhansky and 
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Pavlovsky illustrate how the variance of gene frequencies in an 
ensemble of populations may be increased or decreased as a result of 
choosing different sample sizes of populations. Insofar as 
manipulating genetic variance is possible, via selecting larger or 
smaller populations, drift is a cause of evolutionary change in 
Woodward’s sense. Shapiro and Sober thus argue that drift “supervenes” 
over changes in Ne, effective population size. Drift is neither 
epiphenomenal nor causally inert, they say, because you cannot 
“wiggle” effective population size without “wiggling” drift as well. 
It seems that even Pigliucci and Kaplan grant this claim about 
ensembles of populations in their discussion.  They write, “In the 
formal sense, natural selection can be explanatory at the level of 
mean changes in frequencies of heritable features in populations – 
that is, at the level of ensembles of populations… Of course, if there 
are differences in predictive fitness, there must be discriminate 
processes at the individual level.  However, the particular 
differences in predictive fitness we find at the formal level do not 
necessarily reflect those discriminate processes in any 
straightforward way.”(p. 32).  In other words, they seem to grant that 
formal models capture some explanatory relationship; where they stop 
short is in admitting that this is a causal relationship.  And this 
seems largely to have to do with the empirical grounds for claims to 
the effect that selection is operating, “the particular differences in 
predictive fitness we find at the formal level do not necessarily 
reflect those discriminate processes in any straightforward way.” 
In other words, where it seems that the two camps divide is 
first, whether there are such things as population level supervenient 
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causal processes, and second, whether or not biologists are 
empirically justified in their judgments by and large.  That is, on 
the one hand, all parties seem to agree that population genetics is an 
adequate “formal” account of the patterns of statistical distributions 
over time.  Where they disagree concerns how models of selection treat 
property distributions as causes of outcome property distributions. In 
the case of selection, these properties yield fitness differences; 
i.e., properties such as fast speed, antibiotic resistance affect 
survival and reproduction. Thus, at the level of distributions of 
alleles over time, fitness coefficients associated with the possession 
of this or that trait predict outcomes. If we can grant that such 
indirect representations, or the averaging over of the variety of 
actual causal interactions that “fitness” represents is a kind of 
causal model, then we can happily grant that selection is a cause. 
However, not everyone can agree that such indirect representations are 
genuinely causal, or that there is a distinct “process” of selection. 
And at least in part, this has to do with the fact that claims about 
such processes are often underdetermined by the evidence.   
Thus, there is at the core of this divide not only a question 
about the metaphysics of causation, but also, about the matter of 
evidence for claims about population level patterns and processes.  
With regard to the metaphysical question, this is entirely open; there 
remains serious debate in the philosophical literature concerning 
whether causes are one kind of thing or many, and, whether what may 
causally interact with what includes all and only token events, or, 
may also include types of events (Hausman 2005; Godfrey Smith, 
forthcoming). On the one hand, Sober and Shapiro claim that drift is a 
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cause, in the same way that taking a small sample is a cause of run of 
heads for a series of flips of a fair coin. In WALM’s view, however, 
it seems all and only token events are causes; individual births and 
deaths, or physical interactions between individual organisms and 
their environments are causal; claims about the ‘supervenience’ of 
selection are perhaps merely redundant.  One worry about adopting this 
restrictive view, however, is that we would have to give up making 
causal claims about all population level processes.  Yet, this would 
mean that taking smaller samples is a not cause of skewed 
distributions; and, this is to rule out many explanations in 
statistics, biological and social sciences.  It is fairly common, for 
instance, to argue that small sample sizes are a cause of misleading 
experimental results; indeed, this claim plays a central role in many 
of Pigliucci and Kaplan’s arguments (2006). On WALM’s criteria, 
gambling does not cause one to lose money; rather, a particular hand 
of cards or throw of the die is responsible.  This seems to unduly 
rule out a large class of causal explanations that depend upon 
supervenience relationships. 
In sum, what critics of the “consensus view” seem to be arguing 
is that not simply that “predictive fitness” or drift are not causal, 
but more fundamentally, that assessments of the relative role of 
selection and drift are poorly substantiated by evidence.  That is, 
(1) in actual practice, biologists simply assume that the model holds 
true of the system of interest, and (2) more often than not, drift is 
applied to whatever departure from expectation we find in the data, 
with or without sufficient evidence that chance factors rather than 
some unknown other deterministic causes are at play.  
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With respect to this empirical claim, they have my sympathies; 
for, biologists have arguably been inconsistent and not always careful 
about the meaning and application of drift. And, assessing whether 
selection has been acting in any population does require more than 
knowledge of statistical distributions over time; we require further 
information about ecology, etc., and not simply population level 
correlations.  However, Shapiro and Sober would (likely) be happy to 
grant this latter, epistemological point.  It may well be the case 
that many claims about the relative significance of selection and 
drift are unsubstantiated; but this is not sufficient to show that 
drift and selection are epiphenomenal.   
 
 
Conclusions <A> 
 
Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, Matthen, Pigliucci, and Kaplan are correct that 
biologists have reified variables in their models as causal variables, 
when what these variables measure are rates of survivorship or 
fecundity, summations over a host of micro-level causal interactions. 
If you like, the “real” causal events in this context are interactions 
between discrete individual organisms and their environments. 
Selection coefficients are a statistical summation over many “actual” 
causal interactions between organisms and their environment. Kaplan 
and Pigliucci, on the other hand, seem to be arguing not only that 
selection is “epiphenomenal,” but also, that a more complete 
evolutionary explanation would require investigation into the 
ecological details.  In other words, their point is not strictly a 
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metaphysical one concerning whether selection and drift are properly 
understood as causal processes, but an epistemological one, concerning 
whether or not sufficient evidence is mustered for claims about the 
relative significance of selection v. drift.  These two points are 
quite different, and can and should be kept separate. 
On the other hand, Shapiro, Sober, Reisman, and Forber are 
correct (assuming that Woodward’s model of causation is unproblematic, 
and treating drift as supervenient over effective population size is 
regarded as requiring no special pleading), that drift is a cause of 
evolutionary change. In sum, if causal claims are essentially claims 
about how manipulation of one variable, or change in the value of that 
variable, on average, is capable of changing the value of a second 
variable, then in this sense, at least, drift is a cause. 
However, the debate concerning the generality of Woodward’s model 
of causation is not over (Cartwright, forthcoming; Hausman, 2005).  
Whether causal influence requires physical influence, whether 
causation requires relationships between all and only tokens or also 
types, not to mention how we are to assess problems of causal 
intermediaries, all requires further exploration. There seems to be 
room for a plurality of views of causation; with Cartwright 
(forthcoming) I would argue that we should not rule out a variety of 
types of causal explanation. 
Critics of the “consensus view” believe treating drift as a 
supervenient causal process is problematic. How? One potential 
difficulty is that it is difficult to “locate” drift both historically 
and conceptually. What does “drift” supervene over, and is drift 
properly understood as the cause or effect of the distributed random 
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processes that collectively reduce genetic heterogeneity? Is drift 
reduction in population size, gamete sampling, meiosis and 
recombination, the random processes effecting survivorship and 
fecundity, or all of the above? Finite population size is perhaps more 
appropriately described as a condition on the possibility of sampling 
error than a cause of reduced heterozygosity. Surely, decreasing 
population size increases random sampling, but it is also true that 
the causes and consequences of sampling are distributed and different 
at different levels of organization. It is thus difficult to “locate” 
drift at any one stage of this process extended over time. 
There is good reason to be troubled here; for historically, drift 
has referred to any and all of the above – both the variety of 
conditions on, and outcomes of, isolation, inbreeding, and chance in 
evolution.  Drift is often biologists’ catch-all term for any and all 
changes in gene frequency due to stochastic, non-deterministic events.2 
At different levels of organization, and at different time scales, 
however, there are very different “engines” or sources of 
stochasticity. Gamete sampling during sexual reproduction is a 
different “cause” or “engine” of drift from the random ways in which 
survivorship and fecundity might be affected. Thus, while it is true 
that the same basic models of drift are used, at least as a first 
pass, to model drift at different levels of organization and at 
                                                
2 Of course, not all authors agree that there are indeterministic 
events in evolution. Some (E.g. Rosenberg, 1994; Rosenberg, Horan and 
Graves, 1999) have argued that to the extent that drift, if it is a 
process at all, must be a deterministic one, and, deny that 
evolutionary theory’s reliance on statistical explanations is due to 
reasons that are not purely epistemological.  For the purposes of this 
article, this larger set of issues will be set aside here. 
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different time scales, arguably, the “real” causal processes are 
different at these different levels of organization and time scale. 
If one may grant that highly idealized, statistical models 
legitimately represent causes, then population level, supervenient 
causation via selection and drift are unproblematic. However, if you 
hold that all and only ecological interactions between organisms and 
their environments are causal, then treating birth or death rates, or 
population size to be causes, is at best, not intuitively appealing. 
Sober’s reply suggests that evolutionary genetic explanations are 
distinctive; the models, like folk theories of mind, perhaps supervene 
over much more complicated biological details, and are good short-hand 
for population level dependency relations. Insofar as our mathematical 
models eliminate some apparent contingency, or demonstrate how and why 
this observation depends upon some more basic, better-understood 
mathematical regularity, it is explanatory. In this way, models of 
drift explain in virtue of the law of large numbers; smaller sample 
sizes yield different distributions. Yet, this model of explanation is 
itself contentious; what Walsh, Matthen, Ariew, and Lewens seem to be 
contesting is not simply whether and how drift or selection are 
causes, but whether explanations in the biological sciences are 
sufficient if based on idealized models using statistical parameters. 
They seem to be suggesting that we need to understand more about the 
molecular biology, ecology, development, etc., of the organism in 
order to satisfactorily explain evolution. 
Were we to consult the authors of theoretical population 
genetics, perhaps Wright would be more sympathetic with WALM, and 
Fisher would be more sympathetic with the “consensus” view defended by 
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Shapiro and Sober. Wright knew well that his models were 
idealizations, or indirect representations of complicated biological 
interactions, making many strictly speaking false assumptions. Surely, 
Wright would contend, understanding more about ecology, development, 
etc., is crucial to both explanation and testing claims about adaptive 
evolution. Yet, in the Fisherian vein, the models are useful (even if 
only idealized) tools for understanding population level dynamics.  
However, there is, surely, a place for both top-down and bottom-
up explanatory strategies in biology. That is, we need both the 
Wrightian and the Fisherian perspectives on evolutionary dynamics over 
time.  The key is to find a middle ground between the two which 
integrates our best understanding not only of population level 
dynamics, but also, of the messy biological details. 
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Notes 
1. For ease of exposition, “drift” will be used interchangeably with 
“random genetic drift” from this point forward. Thanks to a reviewer 
for noting the significance of the distinction. 
2. King and Jukes (1969) published an article defending the same view 
in Science, with the radical title, “Non-Darwinian Evolution.” 
3. The state of a population is characterized by specifying the 
frequencies of different traits in it. 
4. Brandon and Carson (1996: 324-325) view drift in the same way. 
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[Box] 
 
The Classical Wright-Fisher Model of Drift 
 
The simplest model of drift is often called the Wright-Fisher model, 
due to its origins in the work of both Wright (1931) and R. A. Fisher 
(1922). This model treats the production of offspring as the drawing 
of alleles (where, there are two alleles at a gene “locus”) at random 
with replacement from parents, or alternatively drawing gametes from 
an infinite pool to which each parent has contributed equally. The 
binomial sampling process represents both what was standardly assumed 
to be both (1) a random process of meiotic segregation and 
fertilization, and (2) the role of chance the numbers of (successful) 
gametes produced by parents (e.g., the chance factors while make it 
the case that some individuals have, say, 10 and some 0 offspring 
(lightning striking, etc.)). Together, in the Wright-Fisher model, 
these produce a binomial progeny distribution. In the simplest case, 
generations are discrete and there are only two alleles at a locus. 
So, for instance, consider two individuals in a parent generation, one 
of which is a heterozygote Aa and another a homozygote, AA. Given the 
assumption that the alleles at this locus are passed on via Mendelian 
independent assortment, these two individuals can have offspring of 
one of two sorts, either AA, or Aa, expected in equal numbers. By 
chance alone, they may have an equal number of AA and Aa offspring, 
or, alternatively, offspring that are all AA, or offspring that are 
all Aa. Summed over the population as a whole, the change in 
distribution of genotypes due to this sampling process is called 
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drift. In other words, the “cause” of a drift in this sense is simply 
redistribution due to Mendelian segregation and random fertilization, 
or, accidents of “sampling” of alleles. 
This model makes a number of assumptions; the organisms are 
diploid, they reproduce sexually, generations are non-overlapping, 
there is random mating within sample subpopulations, no migration, no 
mutation, and no selection. All of these assumptions are violated, in 
at least some contexts. In other words, the Wright-Fisher model, 
although the pedagogical and theoretical starting point for almost all 
work on drift today, is hardly ever realized by actual populations. 
Genes of the same chromosome are linked, so they are not inherited 
independently. This means that when more than one locus is considered, 
the theory must be extended to allow for this correlation. There are 
other complications. For example, the progeny distribution is usually 
not binomial; there are often separate sexes with unequal numbers; the 
population may not be mating at random. One way of dealing with these 
complications is to use Wright's concept of "effective population 
number." 
There are a variety of ways of defining effective population 
number: the most common are the inbreeding, and the variance effective 
population size. The inbreeding effective population number is the 
size of the ideal population that would produce the same probability 
of identity by descent among selected individuals as exists in the 
actual population. The variance effective population size is the size 
of a population with the same dispersion of allele frequencies under 
drift, or allele frequency variance as the population being studied. 
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The effective number defined in this way is called the "variance 
effective number" (see Wright 1931 and Crow 1954: 543-556). 
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